Performance Informed Budgeting in Europe: The Ends Justify the Means, Don’t They? by Nispen tot Pannerden, F.K.M. (Frans) van & Posseth, J.J.A. (Johan)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
Frans van Nispen and Johan Posseth
PERFORMANCE INFORMED BUDGETING IN EUROPE:
THE ENDS JUSTIFY THE MEANS, DON'T THEY?
EUI Working Papers
RSCAS 2009/39
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES

  
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES 
Performance Informed Budgeting in Europe: 
The Ends Justify the Means, Don't They? 
FRANS VAN NISPEN and JOHAN POSSETH
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2009/39
  
 
 
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
The author(s)/editor(s) should inform the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the EUI if 
the paper will be published elsewhere and also take responsibility for any consequential obligation(s). 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© 2009 Frans van Nispen and Johan Posseth 
Printed in Italy, July 2009 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
 
 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), directed by Stefano Bartolini since 
September 2006, is home to a large post-doctoral programme. Created in 1992, it aims to develop 
inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the 
process of integration and European society. 
The Centre hosts major research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc 
initiatives. The research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, 
reflecting the changing agenda of European integration and the expanding membership of the 
European Union.  
Details of this and the other research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  

  
Abstract 
The last few decades a revival of the performance budgeting generating a complete performance 
industry. Initiated by the Anglo-Saxon countries, notably New Zealand, the performance movement is 
widespread today. In this paper we focus on the efforts of the three European countries - Finland, the 
Netherlands and Spain - to link inputs to outputs and/or the results by looking at three questions:  
" What is the rationale for budgetary reform? 
" What is the orientation of budgetary reform: outputs or results? 
" Is budgetary reform successful? 
Fiscal stress is a key driver in all cases, but not the only reason for budgetary reform. Other factors 
such as the Maastricht criteria for qualification and participation in the EMU have served as a trigger 
for budgetary reform. The approach differs from country to country, but they are all focused on the 
performance informed budgeting. Besides, the latest developments point in the direction of a more 
down to earth attitude to the expectations of budgetary reform. The success of budgetary reform 
hinges on the quality of performance information that is assumed a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the use of performance information. All complain about the quality of performance 
information. Moreover, they all struggle with the link of the inputs to the outputs or results that makes 
us conclude, addressing the question that we raised in the subtitle of our paper, that the ends do not 
justify - neither moral nor empirical - the means as well as resources. 
Keywords 
Budgetary reform, Performance budgeting, New Public Management, European Union 
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 ‘In the actions of all men, and especially of 
princes, where there is no court of appeal, one 
judges by the results’ [Niccolò Machiavelli as 
quoted in Bull 1999: 58]. 
1. Introduction∗ 
The last few decades featured a revival of performance budgeting inducing a whole 
performance industry. Initiated by the Anglo-Saxon countries, notably New Zealand and to a 
lesser degree Australia, Canada and the United States, the performance movement is 
widespread, nowadays. Within the field of public finance, this has resulted in renewed interest 
in performance budgeting that, in short, refers to the allocation of resources on the basis of 
performance reporting [ex ante and ex post] in terms of output and outcome. Given the 
universal agreement on the value of performance budgeting, the exchange of best practices 
and the promulgation of standards in international forums, we would expect convergence 
towards full implementation of result-oriented budgeting. Comparative studies, however, 
point at many differences in terms of scope, uniformity and success of the reforms [Sterck & 
Scheers, 2007, Scheers, e.a., 2002, OECD, 1997]. A possible explanation for this cross-
national variance is the characteristic of the political administrative system. Literature 
suggests that a country’s reform capacity depends on its institutional characteristics, such as 
the strength of the executive leadership, the degree of centralization and the political-
administrative culture [Pollit & Bouckaert, 2004; Knill, 1999]. Differences can also be the 
result of different motivations for reform, e.g. cost-cutting, transparency and/or 
accountability. These factors might explain why some countries emphasize outputs and 
performance agreements, while others opt for a more outcome-oriented approach. 
In this paper we elaborate on the relation between the rationale for budgetary reform, its 
manifestations and success. Key questions are: 
• What is the rationale for budgetary reform? 
• What is the orientation of budgetary reform: outputs or outcomes? 
• Is budgetary reform successful? 
In the late 80s New Zealand started to experiment with performance budgeting which makes 
it interesting to explore the lessons has been learned by other countries. In this paper we focus 
on three European countries that have reported a coverage of the budget [programs] of at least 
75 percent, but have chosen different approaches in terms of performance orientation of the 
budget (outputs, outcome)1. In alphabetic order we will pay attention to the efforts of Finland, 
the Netherlands and Spain to link inputs to outputs and/or outcomes. A cross-national 
comparison may provide a better insight in successes and failures. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, the design of the study is outlined, followed by a 
short overview of the current performance movement. In the next section we discuss different 
approaches to budgeting, to be able to map the budgetary practice. We then describe the state 
of affairs performance budgeting for a selected group of OECD-member states, before we 
switch to the cases. The paper is completed with a cross-national comparison. 
                                                     
∗ Frans van Nispen is currently on leave at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies from the Erasmus 
University of Rotterdam. Johan Posseth is PhD-student at the Department of Public Administration of the 
Erasmus University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands. He is working on a dissertation about performance 
budgeting. 
1 The percentage of 75 percent of the budget program refers to the OECD/World Bank survey. 
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2. Design of the Study 
The design of the study is follows. Taking the GLOBE-study on culture in 62 countries as a 
point of departure, we assume that [the introduction of] performance budgeting is positively 
related with performance orientation in society2. Using data collected by the OECD/World 
Bank budget practices and procedures database we will first map the state of the art and select 
countries that are ranked high on performance budgeting.3 From these countries we will make 
a further selection based on the level of performance orientation [differentiating in value 
scores]. It is assumed that cultural characteristics influence management practice. For 
example Hofstede suggests that some [combinations of] cultural dimensions are an indicator 
for management styles, e.g. ‘high levels of power distance are likely to be associated with 
process-oriented rather than results-oriented organizational cultures’, and so on and so forth 
[Hofstede, Peterson: 2001: 405-406].  
Next, we switch to the availability of performance information, using data from the 
OECD/WB database of 2003. A couple of qualifications should be made from the very start. 
First, performance information is not limited to performance targets or performance 
indicators, but may for instance also refer to the findings of evaluation studies [outside the 
budget]. The latter are beyond the scope of this paper, but may play their role in the budget 
cycle. Second, performance targets and performance indicators may be generated for both 
outcomes and outputs [Curristine 2005b:131]4, reflecting different foci of performance 
information. Outcome indicators primarily refer to goal-attainment and effectiveness, whereas 
output indicators more geared to [the improvement of] efficiency. 
Third, a distinction should be made between the budget and the budget cycle. All kind of 
performance information from whatever source may be used in the budget cycle, but that does 
not necessarily mean that they are displayed in the budget that is sent to the cabinet or 
parliament. The reason is twofold. First, performance targets may be set as part of the policy 
cycle rather than the budget cycle. They may serve the same purpose, but are kept separately, 
indicating that setting performance targets belongs to the domain of the spending departments. 
Second, performance information from other sources such as the findings of evaluation 
studies follows its own route. 
Finally, we look at the purpose of performance information, i.e. for allocation of resources 
and/or for efficiency. Unfortunately there is no hard evidence to what degree performance 
information is used for which purposes and, therefore, we have to do with the answers of 
respondents of the OECD/WB-survey. The outcome of the survey reflects, as such, stated 
rather than revealed behavior. Besides, the respondents were not completely unbiased. Lip-
service may have had its effect. 
                                                     
2 In fact the study has come to the conclusion that exactly the opposite is true. The relationship between norm 
and reality turns out to be negative, though weak. It might be attributed to the human tendency to overestimate 
what they have not and, conversely, to underestimate what they have [House 2004:249-251]. In this paper we 
stick to the original hypothesis because the alternative hypothesis runs against the situation in New Zealand 
where it, as known, all began. 
3 In fact the study has come to the conclusion that exactly the opposite is true. The relationship between norm 
and reality turns out to be negative, though weak. It might be attributed to the human tendency to overestimate 
what they have not and, conversely, to underestimate what they have [House 2004:249-251]. In this paper we 
stick to the original hypothesis because the alternative hypothesis runs against the situation in New Zealand 
where it, as known, all began. 
4 Targets refer to specific results, often precisely measured [e.g. time, cost, number, etc., which can usually be 
accomplished in a shorter time period than goals, and which are often an intermediate step in achieving a 
broader goal. 
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3. The Revival of Performance Budgeting 
The major drawback of a line-item budget is that it does not provide guidance as a policy or 
decision-making tool. In addition, it may result in misallocation and inefficiency, because it 
does not permit management enough flexibility to address changing situations and often must 
‘use it or lose it’ at the end of the year [Alberta Government, 1998:3]. In order to avoid these 
flaws, the Hoover Committee recommended to replace the line-item budget by a performance 
budget, based upon functions, activities and projects [Hoover, 1950:8], later [1960s] 
institutionalized by Planning, Programming Budgeting System [PPBS]. As widely reported, 
PPBS did not bring what was expected and new waves of budgetary reform unfolded, such as 
management by objectives and zero-based budgeting. It was, however, [roughly] until the mid 
eighties that the idea of performance based budgeting regained strong attention. Spurred by 
economic pressure and increasing demands from citizens to improve public performance, the 
new budgetary doctrine advocates ‘a conversion from a budgeting system that focuses on 
inputs to a system that focuses on results’ [Joyce 2003:10; NPR 1993]. Therefore, in many 
countries, budgetary reform was part of a broader reform package of [new] public 
management.  
The first initiatives to replace the traditional line item budget by a result oriented budget 
date from the late 80s when New Zealand, being confronted with economic recession and 
increasing pressures to spending cuts, decided to drastically reform its government model 
[Boston, e.a., 1996; Schick, 1996]. In retrospect New Zealand has been gone through three 
cycles [Posseth 2009]. The first brought a new budget format, but also output dominance. The 
second featured a shift from outputs towards outcomes by the formulation of strategic results 
areas [SRAs] and key result areas [KRAs]. The latest reforms are geared to ‘managing for 
outcomes while accounting for outputs’ [Norman, 2006]. Though this is an important step 
forward, two major challenges – technical and institutional – are still ahead. The first step is 
formulating appropriate links from outcomes to outputs. Despite the difficulties in measuring 
outcomes, the second step is probably even more difficult to take. New Zealand’s ‘fetish with 
outputs’ [Schick, 2001: 13] is an attitude that can not be modified overnight. 
In this paper we focus on the efforts in the Eurozone. What did they learn from the New 
Zealand experience? How are they doing in comparison with New Zealand? Despite the 
common grounds and rationale the reforms vary considerably in shape and trajectory. Taking 
the traditional line item budget as point of reference, Bouckaert & Pollit distinguish four 
stages in budgetary reform. Accrual budgeting, the latest trend in budgetary reform, may be 
seen as the final step in the trajectory of performance budgeting [Bouckaert & Pollitt, 
2004:70]: 
1. The provision of performance information; 
2. The adaptation of the budget format and addition of other documents; 
3. The adaptation of the budget procedures and timetable; 
4. The adaptation of the method of charging from cash-based to accrual based 
accounting5. 
According to this typology, reforms differentiate on the format, the process and the type of 
accounting. This last step, the switch to accrual based accounting, is beyond the scope of this 
paper which is geared to the availability and utilization of performance information.  
                                                     
5 The capital budget, setting apart investments, may have the same effect as accrual budgeting. One may 
question if the relative share of investments in the budgets does not justify a completely new accounting 
system as it is less appropriate for programs geared to consumption. 
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The practice of performance budgeting can also be characterized by the utilization of 
performance information for the allocation of resources. A distinction could be made between 
two definitions of public budgeting: 
 ‘Broadly defined, a performance budget is any budget that presents information on what 
agencies have done or expect to do with the money provided to them. Strictly defined, a 
performance budget is only a budget that explicitly links each increment in resources to 
an increment in outputs or other results. The broad concept views [performance, FvN/JP] 
budgeting in presentational terms, the strict version views it in terms of allocation’ 
[Schick 2003:101]. 
In this paper we stick to the strict interpretation of public budgeting, though we share Allen 
Schick’s observation that many governments satisfy the broad definition and only a few the 
strict definition. The broad definition may also be called performance based or performance 
informed budgeting that exists in a context of the more traditional input oriented efforts to 
allocate resources [Joyce, 2003:15; Hilton & Joyce, 2003:403]: a budget providing 
information about both inputs and results.  
Figure 1: The Contrast between Line-Item Budgeting and Performance-Informed 
Budgeting 
Traditional Budgeting Performance Informed Budgeting 
Inputs as ends in themselves Relationship between inputs and outputs 
and/or outcomes 
Changes in inputs at the margin Changes in inputs and results for the entire 
program 
Budgeting divorced from planning and 
management 
Budgeting integrated with planning and 
management 
Budgeted resources Program costs 
Source: Joyce, 2003:15 [adapted]. 
In order to be able to obtain ‘the most effects for the least costs’ a budgetary process should 
create, as Roy Meyers has argued correctly, ‘opportunities for comparing ratios of costs and 
effects: for one program from year to year, for all programs addressing one purpose, and 
across programs that address different purposes. Such comparisons are the sine qua non of a 
budgetary allocation process’ [Meyers 1996:178-179. The utilization of performance 
information may differ, however, depending on the level of budgeting. According to Behn: 
 ‘Performance measurement can help public officials to make budget allocations. At the 
macro level, however, the apportionment of tax monies is a political decision made by 
political officials … Thus, political priorities – not agency performance – drive macro 
budgetary choices’ [Behn, 2003:590]. 
At the micro level [management], performance measurement may be used for the 
improvement of efficiency, dividing outcomes by inputs [allocative efficiency] or outputs by 
inputs [technical efficiency]. 
Given the initial focus on efficiency in many countries, we expect a combination of micro- 
and macro-level manifestations in budgeting at the central level. To find out about the focus, 
we will differentiate between output and outcome indicators. Outcome indicators primarily 
refer to goal-attainment and effectiveness, whereas output indicators more geared to [the 
improvement of] efficiency. 
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4. The State of Affairs 
The availability of performance information is considerably limited by the conditions that 
should be met to serve as an indicator or a proxy, foremost that the outcomes or outputs 
should be homogeneous and homogeneous products are rare in the public sector [Van der Kar 
1981:106-112; Bestebreur & Klaassen 2003:21]. A conservative estimate indicates that only a 
small portion of a budget consists of homogeneous products. Strangely enough, the across-
the-board generation of information about results suggests that the whole budget can be 
shaped like a performance budget. In addition, the performance information should be reliable 
and valid. Unfortunately, the quality of the data is not part of the survey. We should, 
therefore, be careful with taking figures on the coverage rate of performance information. 
An overview of the state of affairs is provided by the OECD/WB database of 2003. A 
closer look at the update of the OECD/WB database of 2006/07 reveals that 8 out of 15 
countries report a combination of performance targets and performance measures. In addition, 
countries point to bench-marking and evaluation reports when asked for performance 
information. 
Figure 2: The Availability of Performance Information in the EU-15 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Targets only Targets and
Measures
Measures only Other None
 
Source: OECD/WB Database 2005 [Q. 71] 
The link of inputs [expenditures] to outputs or outcomes is still unclear, but varies from less 
than 10 percent [Austria, Denmark] to more the 90 percent [France, Sweden]. A more refined 
analysis is needed to find what happens if a performance target is not met as programs are 
subject of what In ‘t Veld has called the ‘law of policy accumulation’ [Roeland in ‘t Veld 
1998:154-156]6. 
One country – Belgium – reports that performance information has no impact on decision-
making, but for managing programs and two countries – France and Greece – report no 
utilization of performance information at all. A couple of countries report that performance 
information is used for the allocation of resources between ministries, programs and/or 
projects [see annex], but the results of the survey indicate that performance information is 
mainly used for other purposes, such as justifying decisions, pushing changes or cutting 
expenditures7. 
                                                     
6 Policy makers tend to respond to success and failure in a similar way, i.e. more of the same. 
7 No distinction has been made between utilization by the central budget authority or the line ministry. 
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Figure 3: The Utilization of Performance Information for the Allocation of Resources in 
the EU-15 
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14
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Source: OECD/WB Database 2005 [Q 84] 
A preview of our cases reveals that Finland and the Netherlands provide information about 
both targets and measures, whereas Spain only reports information about measures. The 
information is mainly used for other reasons than the allocation of resources, for instance as 
argumentation for programs changes and/or spending cuts, with the exception of the 
Netherlands where the information is used for allocation between projects 
Figure 4: The Availability and Utilization of Performance Information in Finland, the 
Netherlands and Spain 
Country Information Utilization 
 Targets Measures Ministry Program Project Other 
Finland X X    X 
Netherlan
ds X X   X X 
Spain  X     
Source: OECD/WB Database 2005 [Q 71 and Q 84] 
A couple of caveats should be made from the very start. Performance information needs 
credibility, and here as much depends on the source as on the methods [Pollitt 2006: 51]. The 
data from the OECD/WB-survey are not always consistent and, therefore not always reliable. 
The case of Denmark is illustrative. On the one hand is reported that no performance targets 
are set inside or outside the budget [process]; on the other hand outcomes are used in the 
budget process Besides, they are the OECD/WB-survey of 2005 is still not complete. Only 
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preliminary data are available8 plus pre-view of [a part of] the findings by OECD-employees 
[OECD 2005; Curristine 2005a; Curristine 2005b]9. 
In addition, the data constitute stated rather than revealed behavior as they are collected by 
means of a questionnaire. The respondents are taken from the civil service, but we don’t know 
their names, not to say their position10. We have got the impression that the data are slightly 
biased due to wishful thinking and/or lip-service. A couple of the EU-15 claims that all 
programs are covered by performance targets, but there is no prove that the performance 
information is used for the allocation of resources or the efficiency of these programs [even 
though the claim to the contrary]. A check on the data is needed to draw conclusions.  
Finally, the formulation of the questions is relatively open, leaving room for interpretation 
even though the questionnaire is supported by a glossary. In order to deal with these and other 
flaws and to validate the data we have added information from other sources. On top of that 
we have done a ‘quick and dirty’ survey ourselves, basically focusing on the European 
countries that belonged to the European Union before the enlargement [EU-15]. We hope by 
doing so that the quality of the data constitute a solid foundation for the analysis of the efforts 
to establish a system of performance budgeting. 
5. Finland: from Outputs to Outcomes? 
The Rationale for Budgetary Reform: Integrating Performance and Financial 
Management  
Like in New Zealand the Finnish reforms were spurred by unfavorable economic 
circumstances [in fact the deepest recession in Finland’s history, Joustie, 2006: 4]. Societal 
changes demanded different and better services, but this could not be realized by increasing 
public expenditure.11 Therefore, in the end of the eighties, public and financial management 
reforms were initiated. Being inspired and influenced by initiatives abroad it was decided that 
the main reform approach should be converting public services into public enterprises and to 
introduce performance management. The following aspects characterize the reforms [Ministry 
of Finance, 2006: 18]: 
1. The transfer of ‘chargeable service production’ to market conditions, to achieve better 
customer-orientation and economic efficiency12; 
                                                     
8 The outcome of survey of 2005 does not match the questionnaire that has been published on the OECD-
website, leaving room for interpretation. 
9 The data are probably not completely compatible as the OECD/WB adapted the questionnaire. 
10 The government of the OECD member states has nominated a coordinator in charge of compiling the answers 
to all the questions. The survey has been reviewed internationally by experts in the fields of budgeting and 
public management, and has been tested by several countries. 
11 ‘Researchers were increasingly critical about the quality, quantity and accessibility of public services, and 
administrative studies showed that citizens were to an ever greater extent dissatisfied with the quality of the 
services and the bureaucracy involved in their production.’ [Ministry of Finance, 2006: 17]. After attention in 
the media, the political parties soon took up the reform ideas as well, with the result that ‘[i]n the Government 
Programme administrative reform was given prominence like never before in post-war Finnish politics.’ 
[Ministry of Finance, 2006: 17]. 
12 This resulted in a huge reduction of the personnel in central government, ‘from a peak of over 215,000 in 1988 
to just over 124,000 in 2004. The majority, nearly 90%, of this reduction of 91,000 [42%] was caused by 
converting government agencies and institutions into public enterprises, companies and local authority 
agencies. The remaining 10% resulted from actual rationalization and personnel cuts.’ [Ministry of Finance, 
2006: 20]. 
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2. Political decision-making focused on strategic management instead of operational issues 
[in practice: an extensive delegation an decentralization of day-to-day decision-making]13; 
3. The delegation of authority previously held by central government to the autonomous 
municipalities: government grants to municipalities being paid as a lump sum, with few 
limitations for the local authorities on the allocation of the grant14; 
4. The content and procedures of decision-making involving finances were amended so as to 
focus on the setting of performance targets instead of detailed input allocations. 
Initially the reforms were dominated by budgetary reforms. Lump-sum budget appropriation 
[covering all operating expenditure] was introduced to give agencies greater autonomy. This 
evoked ‘management by contract’, to balance the operational freedom and secure planning 
and control and accountability, and performance budgeting, to adapt the budget format to the 
new financial steering role.15 In 1990, a first pilot of performance budgeting was started 
among a couple of agencies. In the same year, the Finnish government decided that both 
ministries, agencies and institutions subordinate to them should introduce performance 
management in the 1995 budget at the latest [Ministry of Finance, 2006: 19]. 
The First Wave: Lump-sum Performance Budgeting 
From the very beginning the budget was assigned a pivotal role in Finnish performance 
management. Performance information is included in the budget to justify the proposed 
appropriations. A closer look at the explanation memorandum learns that the budget indeed 
contains a ‘significant number of performance information’ for each ministry, agency and 
program [Blöndal, e.a., 2002: 127]. The first couple of years working with the new budgetary 
structure revealed serious start-up problems. Initially performance was predominantly 
expressed in the ‘three Es’: effectiveness, efficiency and economy. Budget documents and 
financial reports gave predominantly information about the ‘individual outputs and indicators 
on agency productivity’ and paid little attention to outcomes [Pöysti, 2006: 6]. Besides, 
linkages between appropriations and outputs and outcomes were poor. Output and outcome 
data were ‘costed’ in only a few cases and the areas for which appropriations are dependent 
on results are negligible [Blöndal, e.a., 2002: 146].16  
Another problem was the quality of performance information. Ministries and agencies, the 
suppliers of the performance data, had major problems in setting targets and formulating 
                                                     
13 ‘The supreme management authorities of central government agencies, the Board or Director General as chief 
executive, enjoy a very wide management authority also in the area of financial management and control. 
Agencies receive a lump-sum budget to cover all aspects of their operating expenditure, including service 
purchases, salaries of the personnel etc. and the Chief Executive make decisions on the detailed level of 
staffing concerning their agency.’ [Pöysti, 2006: 1].  
14 ‘The grants paid out to municipalities from the central government budget were revised, and the sector-specific 
division […] was abolished. Instead, the government grants to municipalities are now paid as a lump-sum 
[with] very few limitations on how local authorities may choose to spend this’ [Ministry of Finance, 2006: 18]. 
15 ‘Management by contract’ is institutionalized by performance agreements between an agency and the 
responsible ministry. ‘Ministries establish performance targets to agencies in their domain of responsibility and 
ministries give also a public statement of the annual financial accounts and performance report of the agencies 
to which performance targets have been established.’ [Pöysti, 2006: 4]. ‘Although the agreement embodies no 
legal consequences, it does embody practical consequences related to the content of this cooperation. The fact 
that a performance agreement is not legally binding has not been considered a problem in performance 
management in practice.’ [Ministry of Finance, 2006: 43]. ‘It is generally accepted that performance targets do 
not need to cover the entire range of operations; instead, the performance agreement can focus on the most 
important points and the results of the budget year.’ [Ministry of Finance, 2006: 46] 
16 Although the information is presented in the same documents, no attempt has been made at actually linking 
appropriations and targets. Equally, results information and financial accounts are not integrated – although 
both types of information are presented in the same documents [Blöndal, et al., 2002: 149]. 
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indicators [OECD, 1997: 61].17 Furthermore, the Finnish politicians had to get used to lump-
sum budgeting and once the economy had recovered, the feeling ‘that essential parts of 
parliamentary budgetary power has faded away’ manifested strongly [Pöysti, 2006: 7]. In fact, 
‘[p]oliticians would particularly have liked to see a return to the debating of the myriad 
individual appropriations in the central government budget’ [Joustie, 2006: 4-5].18  
The shortcomings of performance information had a major impact on the functioning of 
performance budgeting. First of all it discouraged politicians to use the information. In this 
regard, Blöndal e.a. [2002] reported that:  
• Parliament does not have a voice in the development of or take ownership of the 
performance goals [p. 134]; 
• Parliament does not change targets displayed in the budget document, nor question 
results information in the budget [p. 146]; 
• Performance information is not used actively when determining the level and 
distribution of appropriations [pp. 149-150]. 
Secondly, it fragments ‘accountability for outcomes’ of ministers in front of the Parliament 
[Pöysti, 2006: 6]. Without proper output data and clear linkages between output and outcome, 
autonomization is not well balanced by ministerial control. 
The Second Wave: The Performance Prism 
Despite the difficulties, the reforms gradually evolved and it was no sooner than 2001 that 
Parliament established a working group to better align the [administrative] financial steering 
mechanisms with decision-making on budget and legislation. Together with the proposals of 
the central government final accounts working group and a Ministry of Finance working 
group on public management [both presented in 2003], the foundation for second generation 
performance budgeting, were there. The key concept of the new budgetary framework is 
called ‘performance prism’. 
                                                     
17 Other deficiencies are: the ‘highly technical information on performance agreements’; the variance in quality 
of the reporting between ministries; the lack of attention for qualitative reviews and other data that would be 
useful to parliamentarians; the timing of the data [Blöndal, e.a., 2002: 134];  
18 ‘Parliamentary control used to be highly detailed. The level of detail was often down to, for example, the level 
of deciding upon individual university professorships.’ [Blöndal, e.a., 2002: 133]. 
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Figure 6: Conceptual Model of the Budgetary Reform, i.e. the ‘Performance Prism’. 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2006: 34 
Within this framework the basic criteria for performance have been redefined. Central is the 
hierarchy of targets, with a distinction between policy effectiveness [outcomes], and 
operational performance [‘which the management of a government agency or institution can 
influence directly’]. Criteria of operational performance are: operational efficiency; outputs 
and quality management; and management and development of human resources.19 The idea 
behind this ‘performance prism’ is that the new structure in outcome and operational 
performance targets will better facilitate performance management than the former largely 
agency-specific structure [Ministry of Finance, 2006: 36]. 
To strengthen the strategic focus and to improve program management and horizontal 
coordination, the government introduced the Strategy Document of the Government [Ministry 
of Finance, 2004: 12]. This annual plan supports the implementation of the Government 
Program by monitoring the policy priorities20. 
Another important measure of the new reforms is the new statutory obligation for giving a 
‘true and fair’ view in the Government’s performance reporting [Ministry of Finance, 2006: 
23].21 
With the new reforms, the Finnish government meets a great deal of the articulated 
objections to the former budgeting system: there is a more dominant position for outcomes, 
there are better safeguards for accountability and with the statutory obligation for giving a 
‘true and fair’ of performance function the importance of good and relevant data is stronger 
                                                     
19 The basic concepts of performance used to evaluate and report on public-sector operations thus involve four 
basic criteria: policy effectiveness; operational efficiency; outputs and quality management; and management 
of human resources [Ministry of Finance, 2006, 8]. 
20 The strategy document is an annual report in which outcome targets are presented regarding policy programs 
and other issues important for the government as well as estimates of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
measures and of the use of resources. The targets of the document and the allocation of resources are pursued 
in connection with the central government spending limits procedure and the budgetary procedure [Ministry of 
Finance, 2004: 26]. 
21 The purpose of the ‘true and fair view’ condition is that the presentation and content of performance 
information should make it possible to compare outcome targets and operational performance targets in the 
budget with the actual results as reported in the annual accounts [Ministry of Finance, 2006: 36]. 
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emphasized. It is yet too early, though, to properly estimate the impact of the ‘performance 
prism’. Taking recent inspections of the State Audit Office as an indicator for the status of 
performance budgeting in Finland in the near future, we have to be careful to be too 
optimistic. After ten years of experience, ministries and agencies still have major difficulties 
in formulating targets and indicators. In its inspection reports the State Audit Office 
repeatedly noted troubles, such as [Ministry of Finance, 2006: 22]22: 
• Major shortcomings with regards to economy targets and cost targets: ‘Only 16% of the 
agencies had had economy targets or cost targets approved. Productivity targets had 
been approved for only 9% of the agencies’; 
• Concerning service capacity targets, the State Audit Office stated that: ‘For the setting 
of targets it still seems that the situation regarding the various components of 
performance management is the worse the more tangible the component. Similarly, the 
situation is the worse the more the targets and reporting require indicators and 
measurability.’ 
Contrary, taking the assessment and assurance of the Government Controller-General as a 
reference point, the first experiences with the new framework seem to be quite promising.23 
This refers to the annual accounts, however. For the budget no such data is available yet as the 
new structure and criteria have currently only been applied to two pilot projects. Other policy 
domains will not follow earlier than 2008-2009 [Pöysti, 2006: 10]. 
To achieve the objectives of the reform, to conclude, still some major improvements have 
to be made. A critical point is the use of performance data at the level of the government and 
parliament. Both the volume of the information as the focus, to encourage politicians to use 
the information in decision-making. Fewer, better and more relevant targets and indicators are 
key to take a step forward to performance based budgeting [Pöysti, 2006].24 
6. The Dutch Case: From Outcomes to Outputs?25 
The Rationale for Budgetary Reform: Improving Transparency 
Like New Zealand, the Netherlands faced strong economic recession in the eighties and like 
NZ, part of the solution, according to the politicians, was privatization and agencification to 
restore the economy. Shortly, privatization should curbed public expenses by transferring 
government tasks to the market; the logic for agencification was efficiency. For agencies, 
steering and control arrangements were introduced to safeguard ministerial grip and 
accountability [Van Thiel, 2003]. In 1994, under the lead of the Ministry of Finance, a 
refinement to the agency model was made to move the financial management of agencies into 
the direction of ‘output-oriented management’ [De Vries & Yesilkagit, 2003: 158]. In the 
                                                     
22 The State Audit Office is the parliament’s audit office, moved from the Ministry of Finance to be an 
independent office of the Parliament on 1 January 2001, in a constitutional reform. ‘The change was a 
parliamentary initiative. The move stemmed from a realization that the Parliament needed better performance 
and financial information if they were to make an effective contribution to the results-oriented budget process 
created in the early 1990s’ [OECD, 2002: 135]. 
23 According to the Government Controller-General, the Central Government Final Accounts Report for 2004 
gives a true and fair view of the focuses of the central government economy and operations as a whole, and a 
reasonably true and fair view of the main trends in policy effectiveness [Ministry of Finance, 2006: 23]. 
Overall, the assessment is quite positive over the objectives achieved [Pöysti, 2006: 9]. 
24 Relevance refers to the information needs of politicians. To use performance data for strategic decision-making 
more focus on the effectiveness of governmental policy [policy outcomes] and a better linkage of outcomes to 
outputs and resources is necessary [Pöysti, 2006].  
25 The Dutch case is partly based upon Posseth & Van Nispen [2006]. 
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following years, steps were made to establish a result-orientation at a central level26. The 
driving force for performance based budgeting came from another direction, however. In 
1997, in an evaluation of its working, the Government Spending Committee [Commissie voor 
de Rijksuitgaven] concluded that given the timing of the departmental accounts, it was unable 
to properly perform parliamentary scrutiny [De Vries & Yesilkagit, 2003: 159]. Therefore, the 
commission proposed to accelerate and improve the quality of the departmental financial 
accounts. The report accelerated debates and further proposals on both performance reporting 
and budgeting, culminating in 1999 in a proposal from the Minister of Finance to drastically 
revise budgeting and accounting at the central level [Ministry of Finance, 1999]27. 
The First Wave: Policy Based Budgeting 
The new budgetary framework was labeled VBTB [‘From Policy Budget to Policy 
Accountability’]28. The basic assumption of VBTB is that linking objectives, performance and 
resources enables politicians to make better ex ante decisions on the allocation of resources 
and improves accountability ex post. Primarily geared towards clarity and transparency VBTB 
changed the budget format from a line-item budget in a result-oriented budget. Though 
promoting effectiveness and efficiency was not explicitly mentioned as a rationale for the 
VBTB, it was simply the logical next step after the success in the field of the legitimacy and 
management of government spending [TwK 26 573, p. 8]. 
The budget now centers on the three, so-called ‘W-questions’29: 
1. What do we want to achieve? 
2. What steps will we take to achieve it? 
3. What should it cost? 
The first ‘W’ question differentiates between generic objectives and specific goals. The first 
refers to the indeed impact on or consequences for the community [final effect]; the second 
are [manageable and quantifiable] intermediary effects, that give an indication of the final 
effect [Van Nispen & Posseth, 2006: 8]. Departments are required to provide performance 
information at the level of the generic objectives and specific goals. If ‘it is entirely 
impossible to quantify and measure the effects aimed at […] efforts will have to fall back on 
quantifying and measuring wherever possible the products to be supplied or the activities to 
be performed’ [TwK 1998-1999: 13]. 
A mid-term review coordinated by the minister of Finance [2004] concluded that the 
access to and the insight in the budget has been clearly improved. The number of articles has 
been reduced substantially from approximately 800 budget items to 150 policy articles. 
Flexibility has been greatly increased, as a minister is now able to shift money from one 
budget item to another. However, one may question the impact on the ex ante and ex post 
control by parliament, as there has been an increase in the level of aggregation of the 
information that is provided in the budget. There is a trade-off between aggregation and 
transparency. Information that was in the budget before is now more or less ‘hidden’ in the in-
                                                     
26 E.g. in 1997 the Minister of Finance sent a policy note [‘From Spending to Costs’] to Parliament in which the 
introduction of a result-oriented steering model was proposed [De Vries & Yesilkagit, 2003: 158].  
27 For a more detailed description of the reform trajectory, see De Vries & Yesilkagit [2003]. 
28 The acronym stands for Van Beleidsbegroting tot Beleidsverantwoording [From Policy Budget to Accounting 
for Policy]. 
29 The same question are raised afterwards as part of the accounting to parliament, the so-called ‘H-questions: 
Have we achieved what we intended?; ‘Have we done what we should have done in achieving it?’; ‘Did that 
cost what we had expected?’. 
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depth appendix to the budget or only available upon request. The power of the purse is at 
stake here, as the Court of Audit has argued correctly [TwK 29 949, No. 4]. 
Furthermore, it was argued that VBTB has stimulated people to give more thought to the 
intended results of policy, which is an incentive to greater efficiency. However, the 
relationship between objectives, instruments and resources is weak. A problem analysis and 
the role of the government in solving the problem are both absent. The reader is still often 
unable to form a good picture of what needs to be done in concrete terms, and what the 
government contribution has been or will be [TwK 29 949, No. 1]. However, one may argue 
that the current situation still constitutes a major step forward in comparison with the line-
item budget that induced the development in the direction of performance budgeting. 
Insight in the availability and quality of performance data can be gained from the annual 
inspections of the Court of Audit. In sum, about 35 percent of the outcomes and 60 percent of 
the outputs is covered by performance indicators. In addition, an explanation is given for the 
lack of performance indicators for 30 percent of the outcomes and 13 percent of outputs, 
leaving 9 percent of the outcomes and 23 percent of the outputs unexplained [FY 2007]. 
However, it should be noted that the Court of Audit adopted a rather strict interpretation of 
performance indicators30. In fact, the level of performance information might be higher. The 
findings suggest that the budget is more geared to outputs [or throughputs] rather than to 
outcomes. 
Figure 5: Performance Indicators as Ratio of the Generic Objectives 
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Source: AR 2007 
The score does not say much about the quality, i.e. the reliability and validity of the 
performance indicators. In fact, the percentage of performance indicators that is relevant or 
useful is probably substantially lower than assessed by the Court of Audit in its annual report. 
The budget data provided by the OECD/WB indicate that performance information is used for 
both the allocation of resources between programs and within programs. The same applies for 
the improvement of efficiency as expenditures are linked to outcomes or outputs [if any]. 
                                                     
30 The objectives, for instance, are considered to conform only if the outcome is specified in an ‘effect indicator’ 
containing a target value that is measurable through a performance indicator and that is limited in time [AR, 
2005a]. If one of these criteria is not met, then the overall score is negative, even though the score might be 
positive on the other two requirements. A similar method applies for outputs. 
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Unfortunately there is no prove that the VBTB has led to a better performance in terms of 
allocation or efficiency. 
The Second Wave: Beyond Arithmetic? 
Despite critical remarks from the midterm review and the Court of Audit, VBTB is only 
slightly changed, recently. One of the most important adjustments is the introduction of the 
‘comply or explain’ clause. Five years after the introduction of VBTB, the government 
weakened its expectations with regard to performance indicators. The current line of 
reasoning is that performance measurement is not always ‘useful and relevant’ and, according 
to the Minister Finance, politicians should be aware of ‘arithmetic-fetish’: ‘More important 
than measurable general objectives is a convincing explanation about the way in which 
specific goals and instruments deployed contribute to the general objective’ [TwK 29 949, 
No. 1, p. 38]. This new point of view was translated into the budgetary rules of 2005 by the 
criteria ‘useful and relevant’ for performance measurement. At the request of Parliament 
[motion Douma et al. TwK 29 949, No. 11], fearing a hollowing out of ‘performance’ in the 
budget, the new adage is restrained by a ‘comply or explain’ clause: the condition that a 
department should inform Parliament about those budget items for which it does not make 
sense, or it is not relevant in its opinion, to formulate performance indicators. 
Surprisingly, in 2006, some changes in the budgetary rules were made that represent a 
revaluation of performance information. Within performance data a distinction is made 
between ‘meetbare gegevens’ [literally: ‘measurable data’] and performance indicators on the 
one hand and ‘kengetallen’ on the other hand. The first group is in fact a continuation of the 
initial performance indicators. The only difference is that for outcome objectives, it is called 
‘meetbare gegevens’ and for output objectives it is called performance indicators.31 Whereas 
for both categories the criteria ‘useful and relevant’ apply, ‘kengetallen’ are the more 
facultative, intended to stimulate departments to include performance information about the 
general policy context.  
The two recent changes to VBTB are illustrative of the Dutch government’s hesitation 
about the scope and focus of performance based budgeting. After a period of high 
expectations in the beginning, since the midterm review the ambitions seem to be more down 
to earth. Given the critical remarks of the review a more radical revision of VBTB might have 
been expected. Nevertheless, the decision to only make minor adjustments certainly has 
benefits. First of all, both the Ministry of Finance and the Court of Auditors invested a lot of 
time to support the ministries with the transformation from input budgeting to VBTB. A 
major revision will again require a lot of time and it is unlikely that the spending departments 
will be enthusiastic about any new budgetary project. Besides, gradually, the VBTB-
conformity improves [see figure x]. From that point of view, the better option for the new 
Minister of Finance might indeed be to count his blessings and be careful with changing the 
budgetary rules32. 
                                                     
31 Apparently the Ministry of Finance wanted to make a slight difference [perhaps to stimulate departments to 
improve the coverage rate of performance data for outcome objectives].  
32 The Ministry of Finance is now working on some changes to the annual report [in particular the timing of the 
parliamentary debates on the account]. Up to now no changes to the ex ante process are announced, but some 
changes might come ahead, since the current Minister of Finance, Bos, is known for his objections to VBTB in 
its current form. 
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7. Spain 
The Rationale for Budgetary Reform 
Public administration in Spain has a hierarchical and legalistic tradition with its focus on 
detailed regulations, procedures and compliance. The legalistic tradition was further 
reinforced by ‘revenue budgeting’ which is geared to control of the level and objects of 
spending, rather than on the results of spending. Consequently, not much attention was paid to 
the improvement of efficiency and effectiveness by civil servants being responsible for the 
preparation and execution of the budget (Ruiz-Huerta et al., 2007: 312). 
Looking backwards at the last thirty years, four overlapping phases can be distinguished in 
budgetary reform [Ballart & Zapico 2009: 2] though the first only brought technical 
improvements such as the introduction of cost-benefit analysis, mainly in the areas of public 
works and infrastructure [1976-1984]. The second prepared the ground for performance 
budgeting by reclassification of the budget into a program budget [1984-1994]. The impact 
was modest and attention faded away in favor of the application and qualification for the 
EMU and the commitment to the medium-term budgetary objective of positions close to 
balance or in surplus (zero deficit) [1994-2006]. The fiscal pressure in combination with the 
fiscal rules adopted at the Maastricht summit has been a crucial driving force behind the 
budgetary reforms that introduced performance budgeting [Robinson 2007: 118]. The 
modification of the General Budget Law in 2003 marks the revival of performance budgeting. 
The First Wave: Program Budgeting 
The first wave of budgetary reforms introduced program budgeting that was considered as a 
step in the direction of the establishment of a relationship between funding decisions and 
results, effectiveness or impact [Ballart & Zapico 2009: 4]. It also created ‘… so-called 
program indicator sheets which were to include in concise and clear form … the objectives, 
indicators, and measures proposed to reduce spending or spending increases as needed in 
order to carry out the program anticipated at its level [as well as] the regulations in force 
affecting the program, with reference to the conditions derived from the same as to the 
rigidity of and changes in spending’ [Ruiz-Huerta et al. 2007: 314]. It is nowadays widely 
accepted that the new budget format has induced a better classification and more information 
about performance [Zapico Goñi 2004: 16]. However, the non-financial information provided 
in the budget turned out to be not useful neither to the Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 
[MEH], the Spanish ministry of Economy and Finance, nor the spending managers [Ballart & 
Zapico 2009: 7]. Consequently, the interest in program budgeting has faded away. In addition, 
political attention and support turned to the application and qualification for the EMU and the 
Maastricht criteria [Ballart & Zapico 2009: 4]. 
The budgetary reform gave birth to the Comisiones de Análysis de Programas – 
Commissions for Program Analysis [PACs] – which are responsible for ‘the analysis of the 
adequacy and validity in relation to their objectives; allocating resources within the budget 
ceilings for each department or program; and ensuring that proposed allocation are consistent 
with priorities set at the political level. It is also intended that PACs should review and take 
into consideration program results in the preceding year’ [Ruiz-Huerta et al. 2007: 317-318]33. 
In practice, the impact PACs has been mainly symbolic, due to both political and technical 
factors. The preparation of the budget is ‘still carried out in a formalistic way, thereby 
                                                     
33 The spending programs should be consistent with the priorities set by the Spending Policy Commission that is 
responsible for the initial allocation of budgetary resources in accordance with the government priorities and 
aggregate fiscal policy. It sets ceilings within which each spending department prepares its budget proposal 
[Ruiz-Huerta et al. 2007: 316]. 
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reducing its relevance without it being even possible in general to establish a clear 
relationship between objectives, activities, and resources’ [Ruiz-Huerta 2008:12]. 
In this context we would like to point at the ‘imbalance’ between the volume of 
information that the Minister of Finance requests of the line ministry, and its capacity to 
process and analyze that information [Robinson 2007: 119]. The information often arrives in a 
rather late stage and the capacity to deal with that information is low. Above all, most 
information is financial in nature, i.e. does not contain much non-financial information 
regarding performance [Ruiz-Huerta 2007: 318].The budget is still very much determined by 
the organizational structure of the government [Ballart & Zapico 2009: 9]. 
The Second Wave: Performance Budgeting? 
The efforts to reshape the Spanish budget into a performance budget got a new impulse by the 
modification of the General Budget Law [Ley General Presupuetaria] in 2003, introducing 
budgeting by objectives and output-outcome control [Ballart & Zapico 2009: 7]. The new law 
established a new framework that seeks to establish a systematic linkage between the main 
objectives of the spending departments and the allocation of resources by the means of three 
innovations34: 
1. Management by objectives: managers are required to specify a relevant set of objectives 
as part of their annual multiyear program 
2. Monitoring: managers are required to prepare an annual report on the achievement of 
their objectives 
3. Program evaluation: spending programs are systematically reviewed on goal-attainment 
In addition, a critical assessment has been made of the quality of the information provided in 
the budget. The working party has come to the conclusion that the information was not 
specified enough to be relevant and useful for performance management. The list of flaws is 
long: the objectives are often ill-defined and not related to activities and resources. In 
addition, hardly any information is provided about outcomes or external impacts on society. 
At best information is provided about immediate outputs. Most information though is 
referring to activities and resources. Above all, information is based on what is available in 
terms of statistical data rather than goal-driven [Ruiz-Huerta 2007: 321]35 
In response to these flaws, more emphasis has been placed on strategic objectives to be 
broken down in operational objectives, facilitating the linkage with so called ‘areas of 
activities’. Indicators make it possible to obtain information about the achievements in 
previous years and potential outcomes in the future. One may question though if these 
technical adaptations will be enough as the introduction of performance budgeting is not a 
completely neutral exercise. A non-participatory approach to budget reform may result in 
either a merely formal compliance, ‘creative budgeting’, or even rejection of performance 
budgeting’ [Ruiz-Huerta 2007: 326].  
What can be done? Following Ruiz-Huerta et al., continuous political support is needed. In 
addition attention should be paid to the cultural variables, such as the deeply rooted 
hierarchical and legalistic tradition. The adoption of new regulations, procedures and 
guidelines is not longer enough, though Montesinos claims that the legalistic tradition does 
not constitute a significant implementation barrier [Montesinos 2002: 345]. A more 
                                                     
34 The same budgetary reform created a new agency, called Agencia Estatal de Evaluacion, in charge of the 
evaluation of spending programs. The agency is located in the Ministry of Public Administration 
35 In addition, programs are badly conceptualized and overly broad, lack a clear definition, do not refer to specific 
target group. 
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managerial attitude is required to make the implementation of performance budgeting a 
success. 
8. Cross-National Comparison: Impressions, Observations and Statements 
In this paper we looked at the revival of performance budgeting in the EU-15, taking the 
GLOBE-study on 62 countries as point of departure. At face value, the effect of culture on 
budgeting practice is limited: the country with the highest ranking [Finland] is not the better 
‘performance budgeteer’, instead, the Dutch situation does not differ much from the other two 
countries. A possible explanation is that countries that score relatively high on performance 
orientation [Finland] have output-dominance, whereas countries with a relatively low score 
[the Netherlands] are more focused on outcomes. We should be careful drawing to fast 
conclusions, however, since the scores of the countries do not discriminate much [6.11 for 
Finland against 5.49 for the Netherlands at a 7 points scale]. 
In the opening section we raised three key questions: 
• What is the rationale for budgetary reform? 
• What is the orientation of budgetary reform: outputs or outcomes? 
• Is budgetary reform successful? 
We will turn now to these questions separately before drawing some lessons from the efforts 
of a selected number of European countries to replace the traditional line item budget by a 
performance or at least performance informed budget. 
The first research question deals with the rationale for budgetary reform. Fiscal stress has 
been a major driver in all cases, but turns out to be not the only explanation. In the case of 
both Finland economic pressure has gone along with citizens’ demands for better 
performance. The impetus in the Netherlands came from parliament, while the Maastricht 
criteria for the EMU constitute the trigger for the reform of the Spanish budget. As a 
consequence, the budget reforms in the first two cases were more aligned to new public 
management than the last two cases. This might also explain the focus in Finland which is 
mainly directed at outputs: performance budgeting is the counterweight for the increase in 
managerial autonomy to safeguard public accountability. In the other two countries – the 
Netherlands and Spain – public accountability is not at risk as this managerial autonomy is 
not translated into the central budget36. To put it differently, the starting point of the Dutch 
and Spanish budget is policy, respectively program [outcome], whereas the focal point of the 
Anglo-Saxon and Nordic budgets is performance [output].  
The orientation regarding performance differs from country to country, but the 
performance movement is still going ahead. Perhaps the pace of the reforms is not as fast as 
initially, but still significant steps forward are taken. Two observations could be made. First, 
we found performance informed budgeting. In none of the cases the ‘strict’ definition of 
performance budgeting applies: increments in resources are not explicitly linked to increments 
in outputs or results37. Second, it is not a single movement, though they converge to the same 
point. A closer look at the cases may illustrate this point. The start of the Dutch efforts was in 
the outcomes, but due to the constraints they focus more and more on outputs. The opposite 
applies in the Finnish case, where we featured a development from outputs towards outcomes. 
                                                     
36 It should be noted though that the budgetary reform in the Netherlands is not restricted to the allocation of 
resources and the improvement of efficiency. The scope of the budgetary reform is geared also to the 
improvement of accountability. 
37 In individual cases, politicians may use performance information for decision about the allocation of resources, 
but this something different than performance budgeting [in the strict interpretation]. 
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You may say that they meet each other somewhere in the middle. The latest developments 
indicate a more down to earth stance by the adoption of a ‘comply or explain’, respectively 
‘true and fair’ clause.  
The success of the budgetary reforms can be measured too by the extent that countries 
succeeded to implement performance budgeting at the central level, in short: to what extent 
does the budget [process] inform politicians about performance [‘broad definition’]38. We 
focused particularly on the budget format, the availability and quality of performance 
information. All report a high degree of coverage of the budget which does not surprise as we 
selected on the basis of the availability of information. All complain, though, about the 
quality of performance information which is supposed to be a necessary, though not sufficient 
condition for the utilization of performance information for either allocation or efficiency. 
 
                                                     
38 An additional question is if the budget explicitly link each increment in resources to an increment in outputs or 
results [‘strict’ definition of performance budgeting], but this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Figure 7: The State of Affairs of Performance Budgeting  
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In sum, taking the cases together, it can be argued that all countries have made considerable 
progression with the Netherlands and Spain with a stronger policy orientation, better equipped 
for allocation [at the macro level], while Finland is stronger on efficiency [micro level]. All 
struggle with: 
•  ‘technical’ problems: formulating goals and indicators; 
• linking outputs and outcomes; 
• linking appropriations and outputs/outcomes. 
All countries started new initiatives to compensate for the major deficiencies, but the effects 
of these changes are yet to be seen. First of all, the case of New Zealand learns that, while it is 
relatively easy to introduce the basics, it is quite difficult to completely change the way of 
budgeting. Next to that, because it is a time-consuming trajectory, it is yet too early to assess 
the impact of the recent modifications. On the other hand, we should not be too skeptical. 
There is reason to belief that, to some degree, the dialectics of progress apply and that 
countries take benefit from the experiences of reform pioneers.39 If not by their own initiative, 
there is a good change that countries are stimulated by the international community, such as in 
the OECD, EU, or IMF networks. Note that the Spanish efforts have been stimulated by the 
Maastricht criteria for qualification for and participation in the Eurozone. 
Finally, a couple of remarks could be made. First, we want to question the across-the-
board approach of performance budgeting. The requirement of homogeneous products is often 
not met in the public sector. In fact, only a small portion of the budget consists of 
homogeneous products and, therefore, one should not expect full coverage of the budget by 
performance information. To put it differently, more differentiation in requirements and 
functions of performance budgeting would be appropriate. Second, the appropriation is still 
done on the basis of inputs in contrast with New Zealand where parliament authorizes 
outputs. Besides, the link of these inputs with outputs or even outcomes is rather weak which 
makes us conclude, addressing the question that we raised in the subtitle of our paper, that the 
ends do not justify – neither morally nor empirically – the means. Last, but not least the 
impact of performance budgeting is still unclear. Despite claims of the contrary, there is 
hardly any evidence that the allocation of resources has been improved due to the availability 
of performance information40 which does not come much of a surprise as we lack a criterion 
to make a choice between extra spending for ‘guns versus butter’. The balance sheet of 
performance budgeting though may be more positive as the utilization of information is often 
indirect and, therefore, less visible. 
                                                     
39 Both Finland and the Netherlands indeed took notice of lessons learned in other [pioneering] countries, such as 
New Zealand and the United States.  
40 The same applies for effectiveness and efficiency, linking inputs [expenditures] to outcomes, respectively 
outputs. 
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Appendix 1: Performance Orientation in the EU-15 [Values in Society] 
A B C D 
Portugal 6.40 Finland 6.11 Greece  5.81 Netherlands 5.49 
 Austria  6.10 Spain  5.80  
 Italy  6.07 Sweden 5.80  
 Germany* 6.05 France  5.65  
 Ireland  5.98 Denmark 5.61  
 New Zealand 5.90   
 England 5.90   
 
* Average of West and East Germany 
 
Source: House 2004: 251 [Belgium and Luxembourg are not part of the study]. 
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Appendix 2: OECD/WB Database 2003 
 Availability Formulation Utilization 
EU-15 5.4.a.2 5.4.a.2 5.4.a.3 5.4.a.3 5.4.a.4 5.4.b.2 5.4.b.3 5.4.c.2 5.4.c.3 5.4.c.7 
           
Aus. No No No No Inside Yes Outside No No Yes 
Bel. Yes < 25% Yes < 25% Inside Yes Combi Yes Yes  
Den. Yes > 75% Yes > 25% Inside No  Yes Yes Yes 
Fin. Yes > 75% Yes > 75% Inside Yes Inside Yes Yes Yes 
Fr. Yes > 50% Yes < 25% Inside Yes     
Ger. Yes < 25% Yes > 25% Inside Yes Outside Yes Yes Yes 
Gr. Yes < 25% Yes < 25% Inside Yes Inside Yes Yes  
Ier. No No No No No No  No No  
It. No No No No No Yes Inside Yes No  
Lux.           
Neth. Yes 100% Yes > 75% Inside Yes Inside Yes Yes Yes 
Port. No No No No No No Other Yes Yes Yes 
Sp. Yes 100% Yes 100% Inside Yes Inside Yes Yes Yes 
Sw. Yes 100% Yes < 25% Other No Outside Yes No Yes 
UK     Inside Yes Inside No Yes Yes 
           
Explanation          
           
5.4.b.2: Ministries, outcomes and/or outputs [Category 1, A 1-2] 
5.4.b.3: Inside versus outside [A 2-4] 
5.4.c.7: Allocation [Category 1 and 2, A 1-5] 
 
Frans Van Nispen and Johan Posseth 
26 
Appendix 3: OECD/WB Database 2005 
 Availability [Q71] Utilization [Q84] 
EU-15 Target Measure Evaluation Bench Other None Ministries Programs Projects Other None 
       84 b 84 c 84.d 84 e-j 84.a 
            
Aus. Yes  Yes       Yes  
Bel.      Yes    Yes Yes 
Den. Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes  Yes  
Fin. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes     Yes  
Fr. Yes Yes          
Ger. Yes Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes  
Gr. Yes           
Ire. Yes Yes Yes       Yes  
It.  Yes Yes    Yes Yes  Yes  
Lux.   Yes       Yes  
Neth. Yes Yes Yes Yes     Yes Yes  
Port.     Yes    Yes Yes  
Sp.  Yes Yes    Yes Yes    
Sw. Yes Yes Yes Yes     Yes Yes  
UK Yes Yes        Yes  
            
Total 10 10 10 5 2 1 3 4 4 12 1 
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